"War is too serious a matter to entrust to the generals," warned Georges Clemenceau, the French statesman. But that seems to be exactly what the beleaguered Israeli Prime Minister Elmud Olmert sanctioned when he opened the Gaza can of worms on December 21.
Despite the fact that Israel has an arsenal of state-of-the-art spy drones, satellite imagery technology and sleek fighter jets, this did not prevent the Israeli Defense Forces [IDF] from behaving like a raging bull in a china shop, smashing everything in sight and range. Where were the "surgical strikes" to limit the civilian deaths?
Admittedly, breaking things is what armies are hired to do. But if the collateral damage becomes excessive the generals and the politicians will lose the battle for the moral high ground - the most important terrain of any war.
The statistics of this war (which Israel says it initiated in order to destroy supply tunnels on the Gaza-Egyptian border, as well as neutralize Hamas' ability to lob crude missiles into southern Israel) are hard to fathom: out of the 1,300 Palestinians killed, rights groups say that about 700 were civilians. UNICEF, the UN child agency told Voice of America that 300 children were killed, and 1,500 wounded in the conflict.
Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who may be looking to steel her image before upcoming elections, explained the high number of deaths as "products of circumstance." Many observers tend to agree with this cold account by arguing that Hamas, which is regarded as a terrorist organization by the United States and Israel, is practically indistinguishable from the 1.4 million Gazans who call the 25-mile long x 6-mile wide Strip - one of the most densely populated regions of the world - their home.
But does the complexity of weeding out Hamas, which came to power in January 2006, justify the level of destruction that has been visited upon tiny Gaza? (It must be noted here that many Palestinians believe that Hamas is sabotaging their chances for a homeland, which explains why the West Bank remained surprisingly calm during the hostilities. On June 18, 2007, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas issued legislation outlawing the Hamas militia and executive force).
Nevertheless, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned Israel's use of "excessive force" during his anti-war tour across the Middle East and warned that "Israel is hurting innocent people and it must restrain itself."
The United Nations knows a thing or two about the IDF's dodgy track record. UN-run schools were attacked at least four times during the three-week no-contest. In the deadliest such strike, 43 people were killed when an Israeli tank fired upon one of the schools in the northern town of Jabaliya on January 6. The IDF defended the attack by releasing video footage - dated 2007 - showing militants at the school. The UN fiercely denied that there were any combatants in the building.
The next blunder is even more unfathomable. On the same day that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon arrived in Israel to plead the case for peace, the IDF laid out the red carpet by shelling the UN Relief and Works Agency in the Gaza Strip. The attack destroyed many tons of food and humanitarian packages intended for Palestinian refugees.
Ban Ki-Moon is not the first UN Secretary General to demand an explanation from Israel for attacks on UN structures. During the Lebanon War, on July 25, 2006, four UN observers - from Austria, Canada, China and Finland - were killed when the Israeli air force destroyed their observation post. The post had been "earlier shelled 14 times by Israeli artillery," the BBC reported. A case of mistaken identity? An errant rocket barrage? Possible, but highly unlikely; the UN provides the combatants of any conflict with the precise GPS coordinates of their observers in order to avoid such tragedies.
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan told reporters, "I am shocked and deeply distressed by the apparently deliberate targeting... of a UN Observer post in southern Lebanon."
Finally, Israel succeeded at alienating the one party that few can afford to alienate: the media. Human Rights Watch wrote in a report dated January 5: "Since November 2008... the Israeli government has sharply restricted access to Gaza for foreign journalists and human rights monitors, and none has been permitted entry since the current military campaign began on December 27."
On Nov. 21, 22 executives from the world's major news organizations, including the Associated Press, BBC, CNN and Reuters sent a letter to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, complaining about the "prolonged and unprecedented denial of access to the Gaza Strip for the international media."
Why Gaza, Why Now?
The motivation for the war could be explained in terms of North, East, West and South.
North: In July 2006, the IDF launched an attack against Hezbollah in Lebanon in retaliation for the latter's cross-border operation, which left three Israeli soldiers dead and two in the hands of the Islamic paramilitary force. The war lasted 33 days, and ended without a decisive victory for either side, which Hezbollah naturally proclaimed as a victory. Prime Minister Olmert, who is already embroiled in a corruption investigation, was subjected to harsh criticism at home for his handling of the war.
East: Israel needs to demonstrate to Iran, which is actively pursuing a nuclear program allegedly for energy purposes only, that the IDF is far better organized than the war in Lebanon seemed to suggest. In the words of the Israeli daily Haaretz, "In many respects, the war in Gaza has compensated for the shortcomings of the Second Lebanon War. This time around, the decision to launch the offensive was calculated and reasoned, and the army has shown impressive capabilities."
West: Israel launched Operation Cast Lead during the cracked window of opportunity between the pitch-black twilight of the Bush Err and the thundering stampede of President Barack Obama's hope machine. That Israel understands the sensitivity of its timing was underscored by its decision to politely withdrawal from Gaza on Mr. Obama's first working day in the Oval Office.
Since nothing is certain in war besides bloodshed, nobody could have predicted with any certainty that Iran, for example, or Hezbollah, would not have come to the defense of Gaza at some point in this terribly lopsided conflict. Such an unthinkable, yet theoretically possible scenario would have obliged the now safely retired US Commander-in-Chief, G.W. Bush to enter the fray, possibly even offering him a stay-in-office free card by declaring a state of emergency, thus delaying Obama's Inaugural Ball. After all, when have the Neocons ever refused an open invitation to a war?
Incidentally, and a bit oddly timed, a story broke in the US smack in the middle of the war, which argued that Bush refused a request from Israel for bunker-busting bombs it wanted, supposedly for an attack on Iran's main nuclear complex at Nantaz.
"The White House denied that request outright," The New York Times reported, "but the tense exchanges... prompted the White House to step up intelligence-sharing with Israel and brief Israeli officials on new American efforts to subtly sabotage Iran's nuclear infrastructure, a major covert operation that Mr. Bush is about to pass off to President-elect Barack Obama."
This article was published one week after the US was severely rebuked in diplomatic circles for blocking a UN Security Council statement that called for an immediate ceasefire between Israel and Gaza. Had the US not vetoed the statement, it would have become part of the council's official record without any legally binding resolutions.
South: Hamas, which is popular with many Palestinians due to its social initiatives, nevertheless calls for the destruction of Israel, and is ranked as a terrorist organization by the US and Israel. In January 2006, Hamas beat out Fatah in parliamentary elections. This was a big surprise for Israel, which had just pulled out of the Gaza Strip.
Perhaps Clemenceau had Israel and Palestine in mind when he uttered, "It is easier to make war than peace."
By Robert Bridge
