For some reason, it is with a touch of irony that Russians talk about "our little but proud" Baltic neighbors, about their armed forces, their foreign policy, and their political demarches. Needless to say, any reference to intelligence operations conducted by Lithuanian, Latvian or Estonian government agencies against this country typically evoke a skeptical smile among the Russians.

Almost nothing is known to the public about the Baltic knights of the cloak and dagger. The following story about the Latvian special services sheds some light on the matter, suggesting that the skeptical smiles may be misplaced. As the saying goes, still waters run deep.

On Alert

It is known that there are three main special services in Latvia that perform intelligence and counterintelligence functions: the Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution (BPC), the Security Police (an Interior Ministry branch), and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (a Defense Ministry agency). There is also the Information Analysis Service, which answers directly to the prime minister and is not formally authorized to conduct intelligence operations at home or abroad.

The Security Police gives special priority to monitoring the activity of Latvian political and public organizations that uphold the interests of the country's "non-native" population. The SP has a diversified covert intelligence network among Russian speaking politicians and journalists. The SP main success story in recent times was its series of "prophylactic measures" that blocked mass protests by students against the abolition of secondary education courses in Russian (on September 1, 2004).

The agency also uses its covert agents to gather sensitive information about Russia's policy with respect to "the Russian speaking part of Latvia's political field." The SP is especially interested in any information circulating within the RF State Duma, the RF governmental commission for contacts with Russians living abroad, and the Russian Center for International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation (a Foreign Ministry agency). Yet it should be noted that the SP's main priority is political surveillance at home, not espionage abroad.

The Military Intelligence and Security Service provides counterintelligence support for Latvia's Defense Ministry and its Armed Forces, monitors the situation in the deployment areas of the "limited military contingents" in Iraq and Afghanistan, and helps bring Georgian and Moldovan colleagues up to NATO standards.

Yet by far the most curious organization is the Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution (BPC), which is the major intelligence and counterintelligence agency. The BPC is linked to NATO and closely supervised by US and UK special services. The sheer fact that the BPC director is a former British national, Janis Kazocins, purportedly a retired brigadier general of Her Majesty's Armed Forces, speaks volumes about this organization. The BPC is NATO's outpost in Latvia, where only "politically trustworthy" individuals will find gainful employment.

The bulk of the staff is comprised of natives of provincial towns and settlements in the districts of Kurzeme and Vidzeme, which are considered to be the stronghold of Lettish nationalism.

The BPC's principal function is to counter Russia's interests in Latvia and gather intelligence information about Russia.

The BPC's Eastern Department, which deals with the Russian Federation and Belarus, has a staff of about 100, including members posing as employees of government agencies, public organizations, and private companies. The Eastern Department conducts both intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

Hand in Glove

Aware of the BPC's weaknesses in conducting effective spying activities in Russia, the CIA and the MI6 entrusted Latvia, as a NATO member country, with gathering confidential, albeit not secret information, about the Russian economy. Priority is given to Russia's oil and gas transit policy, and the development of the banking sector. To that end, the BPC actively uses its agents at branch offices of Latvian and Scandinavian banks in Russia, as well as in Latvian oil and gas transportation companies, which have extensive contacts in the Russian oil and gas community.

It also uses BPC officers working under the cover of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in particular the Latvian Embassy in Moscow. Among other things, their US and UK mentors have entrusted them with gathering information about the situation in the Russian regions. Considering regular trips by Latvian Embassy delegations to the Russian provinces, BPC agents may have no difficulty with their mission.

As for the Latvian government, it is interested primarily in information about Russia's policy with respect to the Baltic nations and the development of Russian-US relations. Here, too, the BPC extensively uses its agents in the Russian public-political and business communities, while economic ties between our states also offer opportunities for espionage against Russia.

The BPC also has broad opportunities for recruiting Russian nationals in the interest of the CIA and MI6 as the flow of Russian tourists (including members of the political and business establishment) to Latvia is constantly growing. The BPC has a special bureau in Jurmala, a popular Latvian seaside resort situated only 20 km from Riga, to soften up Russian state and government officials, politicians and journalists vacationing and relaxing there.

Latvia's intelligence services are apparently more cautious and discreet than their Lithuanian or Estonian counterparts, but definitely not harmless.

By Sergei Podolsky