Amid an impasse over Kosovo independence and the likeliness that Russia will veto any UN Security Council declarations to the effect, the Kremlin's isolated stance appears to be an often precarious balancing act. As talks continue over granting the predominantly ethnic Albanian province complete independence from Serbia, a Russian ally, what is lost in the shuffle are the reverberations that independence could have for separatist provinces around the world - including those on Russia's doorstep.

"I wonder how much of what I say is going to show up in the English media," Russia's UN representative Vitaly Churkin said last week, just days before the Security Council failed to break the stalemate over Kosovo's independence. "They say Russia is against independence of Kosovo without examining much else."

Addressing journalists, Churkin reiterated his stance that Russia was not so much against independence as it was for continuing negotiations. "No serious international conflict has been settled in 120 days," he said of last week's deadline. Indeed, it is Russia's calls to continuing talks that point to the real complexity of the nation's stance.

What is rarely mentioned in the West is the fate of pro-Russian separatist provinces in post Soviet republics. These include Abkhazia and South Ossetia, unrecognized provinces in Georgia, and the Transdniester region in Moldova.

"The United States argues that Kosovo is unique and that other places don't apply," said Churkin. "But places with separatist tendencies are watching this closely." According to the envoy, if Kosovo becomes independent it would create a precedent "the shock effect might spread."

Asked in particular about the "separatist tendencies," Churkin singled out Northern Ireland, pointing out that the conflict "took years to settle." Pressed about the implications

for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Churkin admitted that "there is going to be a strong shockwave. It is going to be much more difficult to reach agreement between Georgia and South Ossetia and Georgia and Abkhazia."

These restive provinces have been at the heart of the latest souring of relations between Russia and Georgia since the western-leaning Mikhail Saakashvili became Georgia's president in the 2003 Revolution of Roses. Seen in the West as a conflict of interest in which Russia was trying to assert its influence in "pro-Western" Georgia, Saakashvili's moves to rein in the two provinces, which have expressed aspirations to join Russia, point to a far more complex geopolitical layout.

"However much we support the Serbs, our Slavic brothers, in any case it is impossible for the Serbs and Kosovars to live under one roof," Tarzan Kokoity, first deputy speaker of South Ossetia's parliament told The Moscow News. "We hope that Kosovo will be recognized. And for us this will be a carte blanche to push for independence. It will quicken the process of our own recognition."

As early as this summer, Kokoity says, his country backed Russia's stance on Kosovo, "because Kosovo is artificially separating from Serbia. South Ossetia was [historically] not a part of Georgia."

But for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, recognized independence from Georgia is just a step to joining the Russian Federation. "Through recognition, South Ossetia is striving to join with its northern brothers. The results of two referendums have shown that the people of Ossetia strive to become part of Russia." Ossetians as an ethnic group have been split by Russia's border with Georgia. South Ossetia borders North Ossetia, a Russian province, to the north.

In light of this, Russia's stance becomes ever more nuanced, with the opportunity to play the South Ossetia and Abkhazia card. "Russia says that if Kosovo is recognized unilaterally, then they have nothing left but to recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with subsequent accession to Russia."

He did suggest, however, that Russia's firm insistence on continuing negotiations over Kosovo might be an attempt to buy time.

By Anna Arutunyan