The Iraq issue is increasingly moving to the foreground of the U.S. election campaign. Critics of President George W. Bush's Iraq policy (mainly Democrats) have clearly defined limits that they cannot overstep in fighting for votes: they may not target the military or express criticism that could be construed as anti-patriotic. That line of logic must have prompted Hillary Clinton recently to acknowledge US military success in "some parts of Iraq." 

But does this half-hearted recognition reflect the real picture? Let us look at the facts. On August 23, the director of National Intelligence released a paper entitled National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq [full title: "Prospects for Iraq's Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive Update to NIE, Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead. August 2007." - Ed.]  The most optimistic passage in the report is this: "We assess, to the extent that Coalition forces continue to conduct robust counterinsurgency operations and mentor and support the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), that Iraq's security will continue to improve modestly during the next six to 12 months but that levels of insurgent and sectarian violence will remain high and the Iraqi Government will continue to struggle to achieve national-level political reconciliation and improved governance."

So, what is the situation now? "Political and security trajectories in Iraq," the report says, "continue to be driven primarily by Shia insecurity about retaining political dominance, widespread Sunni unwillingness to accept a diminished political status, factional rivalries within the sectarian communities resulting in armed conflict, and the actions of extremists such as AQI and elements of the Sadrist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia that try to fuel sectarian violence."

The authors of the report should be given credit for objectivity: many Iraq watchers reduce the ongoing events to the standoff between the Shiites and Sunnis. That assessment is clearly insufficient. There is no unity among the Shiites, not even within the large Shia coalition that defines the government policy. Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki is not in a position to say that he has the complete and unstinting support of the Shia spiritual leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, let alone followers of the young Shia leader Sadr with his al Mahdi militia. Nor is there unity among the Sunnis. A substantial part of them support the Baathists, who are steadily building up their influence. Some [analysts] lump all members of the underground Baath party together as Saddam Hussein followers, but this view is simplistic. A new leadership is emerging within the Baath party, which is concerned by how the country will be run following the pullout of the occupation force, understanding that restoration of the Saddam regime is impossible, nor does it respond to Iraq's national interests. In their rejection of the occupation and the Shia dominance in the government and parliament, a part of the Sunnis maintain contacts with terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, which apparently regards Iraq as its main base of operations.

The Kurds are another unsettled problem. There is a growing separatist mood in the north of Iraq. But even assuming that it will be possible to restrain the Kurds from creating an independent state, the question about Kirkuk's formal integration into the Kurdish autonomy is bound to arise.

Washington voiced its dissatisfaction with the Nouri al Maliki government. It was first criticized by President Bush. A number of senators, including Republicans, stated bluntly that the Iraqi prime minister should step down before the situation in the country becomes even more dangerous. All of that is happening in the lead-up to mid-September, when the US ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, and US Iraq commander Gen. David H. Petraeus will present a report to Congress and respond to lawmakers' questions about the situation in that country. There is every reason to expect that the report will contain criticism of the government of al Maliki, who was appointed to that post by the Americans, despite the fact that (and probably exactly because) he headed a commission that had been set up shortly after the introduction of U.S. forces to purge Baathists from the government apparatus, the Armed Forces, and security services. It took Washington a long time (amid an ongoing civil war in Iraq) to realize that the bet should be placed on the reconciliation of different political forces.

But as they say, the train has left the station. I do not think that the situation in Iraq will drastically improve after PM al Maliki, concerned by the US discontent, called a conference of Iraqi Shia, Sunni and Kurdish leaders, who were able to come to terms on a number of issues. In one major development, Baathists, former associates of Saddam Hussein, were permitted to return to civilian and military agencies and organizations. Washington applauded the move, but only because it had to. After all, it is yet another indication of the US's reckless, unscrupulous course toward Iraq: when the allegations that Iraq had nuclear weapons collapsed dismally, the military strike against it was justified by the need to overthrow the "hateful, anti-democratic regime" of Saddam Hussein. 

Incidentally, the Baath party rejected that agreement. The party press secretary said that the Baathists will have nothing to do with the Iraqi government as long as foreign troops remain in the country.

The US's room to maneuver in Iraq is shrinking. Will Washington be able to find a way out of the Iraqi deadlock without an international conference of all Iraqi political forces, as well as Iran, Syria, other Arab states, and permanent members of the UN Security Council? It should be recalled that this proposal has been repeatedly put forward by Russia. 

By Yevgeny Primakov
Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences

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