No action stands alone. All choices produce a counter-action, some planned and others which spin the process out of control.
In diplomacy, there are no guarantees. Everyone acts in the name of rationality. Rationality is defined differently by every actor. Cold War nuclear policy was based upon Mutually Assured Destruction. The assumption was that both Russia and the U.S. would threaten, but never act irrationally with weapons.
The danger arises when rationality does not fit an existing pattern, or when ideological or past historical events become the guiding principle.
Destroying the Taliban in Afganistan was an understandable and acceptable response after September 11th. The extension of this revenge to Iraq was not accepted internationally.
Some actions are taken in the hope of the enemy's overreaaction. Osama bin Laden hoped that September 11th would produce the predictable Bush reaction, causing anti-Americanism and a split between the Muslim world and the West.
The cultural context often defines rationality.
Iranian President Ahmadinejad's actions reflect a ‘rationality' which is outside Western logic. It becomes difficult for the U.S. to develop a policy towards Iran, because historical events still shape its response. The Iranian leadership is still reacting to American support for the Shah and other historical events which most Americans do not even remember.
Arabs and Israelis have become so fixed in past hatred that current actions cannot be separated from 60 years of real and imagined offenses on both sides.
The most civilized responses are tit-for-tat.
Four British diplomats have been removed from Moscow, and visa restrictions have been tightened in response to London's parallel action. Everyone understands that Russia will not extradite Andrei Lugovoi, just as the British will not send Boris Berezovsky or Akhmed Zakayev to Moscow .
The Chinese restricted American meat imports following U.S. Department of Food and Drug Administration restrictions on Chinese farm-raised seafood.
For some, responses reflect relative power. Insurgent actions in Iraq acknowledge the reality that they could not defeat the enemy in conventional warfare.
It is easier to predict a response when faced with centralized decision- makers. Little predictable logic exists when non-governmental actors such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Kurkish nationalists or al-Qaeda react based on ideological fervor.
When centralized actors such as Iran or Syria use actors such as Hezbollah for strikes, they often lose control of what was assumed to be an extension of original policy.
The major danger of response is escalation. Increased criticism by the American congress and administration of the level and quality of Chinese exports, Yuan pricing and growth in military action, have prompted additional criticism of human rights, religious freedoms, environmental standards and future military potential.
Responses rarely represent single issues, but rather compound other, more basic relationships.
The danger with Russia-West relations is not the current diplomatic expulsions, but the broader tensions and rhetoric involving U.S. missile bases, Russian energy supplies and the redistribution of global power.
Actions are often not understood by all participants. As Lilia Shevtsova of the Carnegie Moscow Center notes, the West cannot understand how Moscow's embrace of capitalism did not also mean the adoption of other Western values; and how Russia can both wish to join many Western clubs, yet simultaneously act against other members of those clubs.
The West debates the appropriate response to President Putin. This has not become an issue of love or hate, but an assessment of the need for Russian energy and the fear that Russian nationalism be problematic in the future.
Russian actions and rhetoric seek to establish a climate of equality with other world powers. Eating with Bush and then suspending Russian involvement with the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty the following week reflects an independent actor with freedom of choice.
Europe seeks a response to increased dependence on Russian energy. Their response will never be effective whilst European nations act individually with bilateral agreements.
Europe currently lacks the cohesion, will or leadership to produce a joint response. The possibility of any European-Russian cooperative response is limited while Russia opposes a Kosovo settlement and increases its pressure on the Baltics.
Many European nations wish to believe that given time and outside investment, Russia will become a democratic state. The issue for the West has become how to respond with respect for Russian sensitivities, without abandoning its basic positions.
Some responses have little effect. American sanctions against Cuba to encourage the removal of Castro have produced economic difficulties for the average Cuban, whilst Castro has survived nine U.S. Presidents.
Other responses lead to disaster. Israel assumed that attacks on Lebanon in response to kidnapping would quickly destroy Hezbollah. Israel may have killed more Lebanese and guerrillas, but the cost to their international political and military reputation created the image of a lost war.
The fortunate reality of relationships is that cooperation and engagement can exist alongide tension. We build agreements on limiting Iran's nuclear threat, fighting terrorism, or business with Russia or China, whilst simultaneously seeking to control the level and extent of conflict.
Decisions never occur within a vacuum. The issue is how to measure the response and predict possible outcomes. Response soon becomes an art, whose implications few understand.
By Todd Lefko
